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Intelligent Design and the
First Amendment:
A Response
Jay D. Wexler*
Although the struggle over teaching evolution in the public schools
has never been far from the front pages of the nation’s newspapers ever
since John Scopes was convicted of teaching the theory in 1925,1 the
controversy has recently ascended to new heights.2 In late 2004, the school
board of the Dover School District in Pennsylvania passed a series of
measures requiring teachers to inform students that evolution is incomplete
and to make available to students a textbook on “intelligent design” (“ID”), a
purportedly scientific theory suggesting that an intelligent agent created the
universe and everything in it, including human beings.3 Soon after the school
board took these actions, the ACLU of Pennsylvania sued in federal district
court to enjoin the school’s policies.4 The school board has refused to back
down from its position, and a trial is expected to begin later this year.5 Thus
it would appear that nearly a decade after ID theory first emerged as a major
weapon for evolution opponents, the courts will be called upon to evaluate

Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. The author thanks Jack Beermann,
Ward Farnsworth, Bill Marshall, Trevor Morrison, and Kate Silbaugh for extremely helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1 For a short history of the controversy over teaching evolution, see Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of
Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the
Public Schools, 49 STAN. L. REV. 439, 444-52 (1997).
2 For a selection of recent accounts of the controversy in the mainstream press, see, e.g.,
Claudia Wallis, The Evolution Wars, TIME, August 15, 2005, at 26 (discussing, among other
things, President Bush’s recent support for discussing intelligent design in public school
classrooms); H. Allen Orr, Master Planned: Why Intelligent Design Isn’t, THE NEW YORKER, May
30, 2005; Editorial, The Evolution of Creationism, THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 17, 2005, at
A20; Lawrence M. Krauss, School Boards Want to Teach the ‘Controversy’; What Controversy?, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, May 17, 2005, at F5; Peter Slevin, Teachers, Scientists Vow to Fight Challenge
to Evolution, WASH. POST, May 5, 2005, at A3.
3 See John Riley, A Matter of Intelligent Design: A Pennsylvania School Board Is at the Center of a
Controversial Approach to Teaching Creation as an Alternative to Evolution, NEWSDAY, Jan. 14, 2005,
at A10. Practitioners of ID generally do not specify the specific identity of the intelligent
designer, and they do not describe the designer in Christian, Biblical, or other traditional
religious terms. For more on the theory, see, e.g., Wexler, supra n. 1, at 441-42.
4 Id.
5 See http://www.aclupa.org/legal/legaldocket/intelligentdesigncase.htm (indicating that a
trial is scheduled to start in September 2005).
*

whether the public schools may teach the theory consistently with the First
Amendment.
In a series of recent writings, including a full length book and several
articles, Baylor University professor Francis J. Beckwith has argued that
public schools may constitutionally teach intelligent design.6 In doing so,
Beckwith has considered and critiqued a number of arguments I have
previously advanced in my own writing,7 calling them “hardly persuasive,”8
“wide of the mark,”9 “logically fallacious,”10 “patently unreasonable,”11 and
“philosophically irrelevant.”12 In this Essay, I respond to Beckwith’s
arguments regarding ID, both those that specifically critique my own
arguments, as well as those that stand on their own. I argue that many of
Beckwith’s arguments in favor of the constitutionality of teaching ID fail,
and that the question of whether public schools may teach the theory
consistent with the First Amendment is far more difficult than Beckwith
would appear to believe.

FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN (2003) [hereinafter “L,D & PE”];
Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of Intelligent Design,
17 NOTRE DAME J. LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 461 (2003); Francis J. Beckwith, A Liberty
Not Fully Evolved?: The Case of Rodney LeVake and the Right of Public School Teachers to Criticze
Darwinism, 39 SAN D. L. REV. 1311 (2002); Francis J. Beckwith, Intelligent Design in the Schools:
Is It Constitutional?, 25 CHRISTIAN RESEARCH J. #4 (2003).
7 In addition to the Note cited in n. 1, supra, see also Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and
Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751 (2003).
A new piece on evolution—specifically the Scopes Trial—is forthcoming in the Georgetown
Law Journal, although of course Beckwith has not commented on that particular piece. See
Jay D. Wexler, The Scopes Trope, 74 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming) (book review). Beckwith and I
debated the constitutionality of intelligent design at a Spring 2005 event sponsored by the
Harvard Federalist Society. For one account of that debate, see the discussion at
http://www.pandasthumb.org/pt-archives/000974.html.
Beckwith’s book was also the focus of a Harvard Law Review student book note,
Book Note, Not Your Daddy’s Fundamentalism: Intelligent Design in the Classroom, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 964 (2004), which started a bit of a controversy in the blogosphere when Brian Leiter
attacked the author as “perpetrat[ing] (intentionally or otherwise) a scholarly fraud,” and
argued that the “book note is riddled with factual errors and misleading innuendo from start
to
finish.”
Brian
Leiter,
Harvard
Law
Review
Embarrasses
Itself,
http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/000878.html (Mar. 10, 2004). For more
on this controversy, see Lawrence VanDyke, An Important Sunday Post,
http://fedsoc.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_fedsoc_archive.html#107931360182005218 (Mar.
14, 2004) (responding to Leiter’s critique); Hunter Baker, The Professor’s Paroxysm: A Scholar’s
Attack on a Student Writer—and Academic Freedom, National Review Online,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/baker200403150909.asp (Mar. 15, 2004); Brian
Leiter, The Denouement to the VanDyke Debate about Intelligent Design Creationism,
http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/000954.html (Mar. 16, 2004).
8 BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 151.
9 Id. at 150.
10 Id. at 156.
11 Id. at 154.
12 Id. at 156.
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To be sure, I do not disagree with all of Professor Beckwith’s
positions. Indeed, we agree on a number of important points. For instance,
I agree with Beckwith that courts will not get far by trying to demarcate
scientific theories from non-scientific ones13 (though I do not think this
matters for constitutional analysis); that it is bad policy to teach evolution
without teaching about alternative ways of thinking about origins14 (though I
would address this problem not by teaching intelligent design in science
classes but by teaching about religion in stand alone comparative religion
classes); and that ID should not be found unconstitutional simply because it
lends support to Christianity and other monotheistic belief systems15 (though
I think it is constitutionally problematic for other reasons).
Despite these areas of agreement, I do disagree with Beckwith’s
ultimate conclusion that teaching ID in the public schools would likely be
constitutional. In my view, teaching the theory would raise significant
problems under the First Amendment. More specifically, I disagree with
Beckwith in three important substantive areas, namely whether courts should
find that ID constitutes a religious belief, whether the Court’s decision in
Edwards v. Aguillard16 casts doubt on the constitutionality of teaching ID, and
whether teachers have any first amendment academic freedom right to teach
ID in direct contravention of clear school policy. In this three-part essay I
address these issues in turn.
I.

Is Intelligent Design a Religion?

Beckwith argues that ID is not a religion because it is not a
conventional religion like Christianity or Judaism but rather a “point of view
based on philosophical and empirical arguments,”17 one that simply provides
answers to the same question that evolution answers, namely: “What is the
origin of apparent design in biological organisms and/or other aspects of the
natural universe?”18 Beckwith also argues that ID is not a religion under the
prevailing Court of Appeals test because ID does not address fundamental
questions, is not comprehensive in nature, and is not accompanied by formal
or external signs (like rituals, services, clergy, holidays) that are associated
with those belief systems generally recognized as religious.19 Beckwith’s first
See id. at 23-28; Wexler, supra n. 1, at 466-68.
See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 120-26.
15 See id. at 149.
16 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that Louisiana’s statute requiring equal time for the teaching
of evolution and creation science violated the Establishment Clause).
17 Id. at 149.
18 Id. at 150.
19 See id. at 152-53. The prevailing circuit court test can be found in the following cases:
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981) (denying a free exercise claim of a
prisoner who belonged to an organization called MOVE); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207
(3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (first articulating the test in a case involving
13
14
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point is only partly true but is irrelevant in any event; his second point
represents a correct application of a nonetheless inappropriate legal test for
determining whether ID constitutes a religion. ID’s status or non-status as
religion requires a different type of analysis than the prevailing test provides,
and thus whether the theory constitutes religion cannot be resolved by
application of that test. Although the question of whether ID is religion
cannot be determined by application of any existing precedent, the better
view is that the theory is religious in nature because it espouses a concept—
the world was designed by an intelligent creator—that is inherently religious.
Beckwith is correct, of course, to argue that ID is not a conventional
religion like Christianity. By its own terms, the theory of ID does not
incorporate the corpus of any particular religious tradition; it simply makes a
claim about the origin and design of the universe without connecting that
claim to any particular system of belief. Although it may be the case that
most ID supporters are in fact Christians, and although it is certainly true
that ID theory does lend some support to Christian beliefs, neither of these
facts is constitutionally relevant.
Beckwith is also right when he argues that ID does not meet the
prevailing test in the Courts of Appeals for determining whether a belief
system constitutes a religion for First Amendment purposes.20 That test, as
articulated by the Third and Ninth Circuits, asks whether a belief system is
comprehensive in nature, addresses fundamental questions, and is
accompanied by “certain formal and external signs” common to traditional
religions, such as symbols, rituals, holidays, and clergy members.21 Beckwith
argues that ID fails this test because it lacks these types of signs, is an isolated
teaching rather than a comprehensive one, and does not “address
fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and
imponderable matters.”22 Although one might posit that ID does in fact
address fundamental questions, and although the existence of “formal and
external signs” is not a necessary precondition for religion under the relevant
test,23 Beckwith is on solid ground in claiming that ID fails the test because it
is an isolated teaching rather than a comprehensive belief system.
As it turns out, however, this conclusion does not save ID from
constitutional infirmity. The legal test Beckwith relies upon cannot be the
right test for determining whether ID counts as religion for First
Amendment purposes. If it were, then schools could encourage students to
pray, since the concept of prayer, by itself, does not meet the three part test
transcendental meditation training in schools); Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the city of San Jose could erect a sculpture of Quezacoatl, an
Aztec God, without violating the Establishment Clause).
20 See n. 19, supra.
21 See, e.g., Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032; Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1229.
22 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 152.
23 See Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032 (noting that “a religion often can be recognized by the presence
of certain formal and external signs”).
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either. Likewise, if Beckwith is right, then schools could teach the truth of
reincarnation, karma, sin, or other indisputably religious concepts, because
none of these concepts by itself would meet the three part test. What these
obvious examples demonstrate is that a different test must apply when the
question is whether some concept, practice, or belief in isolation is religious,
as opposed to whether some broader and more integrated belief system
constitutes a religious belief as a whole.24
The courts have not explicitly recognized this problem as of yet, but
it seems to me that the right analysis for the question would ask whether the
concept, practice, or belief in question sounds in religion rather than in some
other area of intellectual inquiry, such that government promotion of the
concept would be understood by a reasonable person as an advancement or
endorsement of religion. Although I will not spell out here in any great detail
what exact questions this test would ask, it would seem that reasonable
inquiries would include such questions as whether a reasonable person would
associate the concept primarily with religion; whether the concept is an
important aspect of the religious traditions that people generally know about;
whether the concept is also prominently associated with ideas or belief
systems that most people do not view as religious; and whether, if the
concept is associated with non-religious belief systems, it is more
prominently associated with those belief systems than with religious
traditions, or vice versa?
Although this test may be somewhat circular,25 and although
application of the test will be difficult at the margins,26 the test is in fact quite
easy to apply in the case of ID. Does ID sound in religion? Does the notion
that an intelligent designer created the world and all of its inhabitants sound
in religion? Sure it does. The intelligent design of the universe is the core
concept of the major prominent Western religions, without which those
religious traditions would be unrecognizable. Most reasonable people would
See Wexler, supra n. 7, at 815-17.
This circularity, however, does not distinguish this test from other tests that address the
question of what counts as “religion” for First Amendment purposes. For example, the
three-part Third and Ninth Circuit tests discussed above, see n. __, supra, by asking whether
the belief system in question possesses some of the familiar “external and formal signs” of
traditional religions, is essentially a circular inquiry: the belief system is a religion if it shares
some of the characteristics of those things we already recognize as religious. Likewise, the
scholarly position that this Third Circuit test most closely resembles—the so-called
“analogical approach” to defining religion supported by Kent Greenawalt, see Kent
Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 753 (1984)
(“[C]ourts should decide whether something is religious by comparison with the indisputably
religious, in light of the particular legal problem involved.”) is also quite circular in nature.
The circularity does not undermine the soundness of the approach. Indeed, circularity is a
common attribute of constitutional tests, and this circularity does not necessarily constitute
an inherent problem for those tests. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88
VA. L. REV. 327, 377 (2002) (explaining why many “issues of structural constitutionalism end
up in a circle” and why this is not a problem).
26 It hardly needs pointing out that this characteristic does not distinguish the test from other
constitutional tests.
24
25
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associate the intelligent design of the universe with religion. There is no
significant non-religious school of thought that has an intelligent designer or
creator as a core concept, even if might be the case, as Beckwith suggests,
that some have used the term “God” in a philosophical sense.27 Finally, to
the extent that Supreme Court language is relevant to the determination of
important constitutional questions (which is a great extent indeed), the Court
in Edwards specifically described the belief that “a supernatural being created
mankind” as a “religious viewpoint.”28
In the context of addressing whether ID constitutes religion,
Beckwith argues that evolution and ID “are not two different subjects (the
first religion, the second science) but two different answers about the same
subject.”29 For example, in his full-length book, Law, Darwinism, and Public
Education: The Establishment Clause and the Challenge of Intelligent Design, Beckwith
responds to my claim that evolution differs from ID in that the former
“deals only with proximate causes, not ultimate ones,” by claiming that my
position is “wide of the mark” because: “Naturalistic evolution in fact
provides an answer to the very same question ID provides an answer: What is
the origin of apparent design in biological organisms and/or other aspects of
the natural universe? Evolution answers the question by appealing to the
forces of unguided matter, the latter to intelligent agency. Same question.
Different answers.”30
It is not entirely clear what Beckwith is trying to do with this
argument. Although it is included in the book’s section on ID’s
constitutional status as religion, Beckwith ties the argument to his claim that
“forbidding the teaching of ID . . . in public schools because it lends support
to a religion, while exclusively permitting or requiring the teaching of
naturalistic evolution unconditionally, might be construed by a court as
viewpoint discrimination, a violation of state neutrality on matters of religion,
and/or the institutionalizing of a metaphysical orthodoxy.”31 To the extent
that this is Beckwith’s main claim, it fails both as a descriptive matter and a
normative one.
For one thing, schools likely do not forbid the teaching of ID, when
they do so, because ID “lends support” to a religion, but rather because they
believe either that it is religion (and thus cannot be promoted in the public
schools) or that it is bad science, and therefore does not belong in a science
classroom. Moreover, Beckwith’s suggestion that public schools must be
viewpoint neutral in what they teach is clearly incorrect. While the
government may not discriminate against private speakers on the basis of

BECKWITH, L, D, & PL, supra n. 6, at 164.
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591-92 (1987).
29 BECKWITH, L, D, & PL, supra n. 6, at 150.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 149.
27
28
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viewpoint in an open or limited public forum,32 there is no constitutional
requirement that the state’s own speech remain neutral.33 If the Constitution
did impose such a requirement, then schools could not endorse any
controversial moral or factual viewpoint whatsoever. They could not tell
students, for example, to stay away from drugs, that gender equality is
something worth striving for, or that the Holocaust actually occurred,
without also presenting the arguments to the contrary.
To the extent that Beckwith is trying to use this “two answers to the
same question” argument in some way to establish that ID is not religion for
constitutional purposes, the argument also fails. For one thing, it is far from
clear that evolutionists would agree that the question they are seeking to
answer is how to explain the apparent design of the universe and its
biological organisms. But even if at some level of generality this were the
question they were addressing, they would be addressing the question in such
a different fashion than ID theorists that they could hardly be said to be
asking the same question in any meaningful way. For evolutionists the
question would be something like: “What is the best naturalistic explanation
that we can study and test and measure using the scientific method for the
universe’s apparent design?” whereas the ID theorists are asking a much
different question, namely: “What is the best explanation for the apparent
design, period?” ID theorists answer this question by pointing to a
supernatural intelligent designer, but evolutionists claim that such an answer
is out of bounds with respect to their question because it is impossible, at
least at this point in human development, to say anything helpful or
meaningful at all within the confines of the scientific method about such a
designer.34
Beckwith claims that by responding to the claims of ID theorists in
this way, evolutionists are committing themselves to so-called philosophical
naturalism, an ontological world-view which inherently rejects the existence
of supernatural phenomena.35 This is simply not true. The fact that
scientists apply the scientific method in their work reflects only a recognition
that historically this method has produced tremendously successful results, in
terms of explanation and prediction of natural phenomena (much better, for
example, then looking to supernatural explanations, intuition, random
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,
829-30 (1995).
33 Indeed, there is not even a requirement that the government’s funding of private speech
(as opposed to regulation of that speech) be viewpoint neutral. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding regulations prohibiting grant recipients from recommending
abortion to patients).
34
See,
e.g.,
Eugenie
Scott,
Scott
Replies
to
Dembski,
http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/3598_scott_replies_to_dembski_2_2_2001.asp
(Feb. 1, 2001) (“One cannot use natural processes to hold constant the actions of
supernatural forces; hence it is impossible to test (by naturalistic methodology) supernatural
explanations . . . Whether a supernatural force does or does not act is thus outside of what
science can tell us.”).
35 See BECKWITH, L, D & PL, supra n. 6, at 6-7; 92-95.
32
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number drawing, etc.), rather than any a priori metaphysical commitment to
naturalism.36 Indeed, many scientists, who use the scientific method regularly
as part of their day-to-day work, are theists, which suggests that a
commitment to methodological naturalism (the commitment to using the
scientific method to explain and predict natural phenomena) does not in fact
entail or imply a commitment to philosophical naturalism.37 My original
claim, then, that evolutionists and intelligent design theorists are in fact
asking very different questions, is hardly “wide of the mark.” Instead, it is
Beckwith’s critique that misses the target.
In any event, the most important point is that whether the two camps
are asking different questions is simply irrelevant to resolving the
constitutional question of whether ID counts as religion. The nature of an
answer—in other words, whether that answer is “religious” or “scientific” or
“political” or “literary” or whatever—turns on the content of the answer, not
the question that it is answering. Different fields of study seek to explain the
same phenomena all the time, but this does not mean that their answers
should be lumped together under the same label.
To take one small example from the legal field, political scientists and
legal academics approach the question of why the Supreme Court decides
cases the way it does in very different ways. Legal academics tend to look at
the specific nature of the legal question presented and the strength of the
competing legal arguments, whereas political scientists tend to place far more
emphasis on the ideological commitments of the Justices and which political
party has been primarily responsible for the appointment of the particular
Justices serving on the Court.38 The two fields employ very different
assumptions and methodologies, and come to very different conclusions.
The fact that they happen to be addressing the same question does not justify
grouping their answers together as representing the same field of inquiry. To
take another example from the realm of religion, imagine a person wondering
whether to eat a lobster. The person asks both a dietitian and an Orthodox
Jewish rabbi what to do. The dietitian tells the person to eat the lobster

See, e.g., Brian Leiter, The Denouement to the VanDyke Debate about Intelligent Design Creationism,
http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/000954.html (“The difficulty [with calling
science’s naturalistic methodology ‘a priori’] is that science did not ‘a priori pick a naturalistic
methodology’; it adopted, based on evidence and experience (i.e., a posteriori), the methods that
worked: it turns out that if you make predictions, test the predictions against experience,
refine the hypotheses on which the predictions are based, test them again, and so on, you
figure out how to predict and control the world around you.”); Matthew Brauer, Steven G.
Gey & Barbara Forrest, Is It Science Yet?: Intelligent Design Creationism and the Constitution, WASH.
U. L. Q. (forthcoming)
37 See Brauer, et al., supra n. 36, at __.
38 For a comparison of the two approaches to Supreme Court decision-making, see
Theodore S. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme
Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1152-60 (2004).
36
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because it is high in protein and low in fat;39 the rabbi tells the person not to
eat the lobster because it is not kosher. The two advisors have answered the
same question, but is there any doubt that the rabbi’s answer is religious and
the dietitian’s is not?40
Thus, even if evolutionists and ID theorists were asking the same
question, it would not mean that their answers should be categorized the
same way. When the evolutionist answers the question of “what is the origin
of apparent design in biological organisms and/or other aspects of the
natural universe” (assuming, again, that this is what the evolutionist is
asking), by responding “the apparent design of biological organisms can be
explained by evolution through natural selection,” the answer does not sound
in religion. When the ID theorist, on the other hand, responds by saying “we
can explain this apparent design by reference to an intelligent creator who
created the universe and everything in it,” that answer sounds in religion.41
The two answers are fundamentally different in kind and category, even if we
assume that the two questions are the same. The Establishment Clause
simply prohibits the government from teaching the religious answer (but not
the non-religious answer) as truth.
All this wrangling over whether ID constitutes “religion” may,
however, be beside the point. After all, although public schools cannot
promote or advance or endorse or teach the truth of any religion, they are
perfectly free to teach about religion as much as they want.42 They can teach
about Christianity, about Judaism, about Zoroastrianism, and about Raelianism.43
Not only can they teach about religion, but they should teach about religion,
and they do not teach about religion nearly enough.44 So, if public schools
can teach about religion, why shouldn’t they be able to teach about ID? To
some degree they certainly can. For example, if a public school chose to
teach about the ID movement in a current affairs class, or about the
philosophical claims of ID in a philosophy of science class, or about the
truth claims of ID in a comparative religion class, most likely these choices
would pose no constitutional problem at all.

This is true. See http://www.nutritiondata.com/facts-001-02s037v.html (noting that, despite
having 104 milligrams of cholesterol, 1 cup of cooked northern lobster has thirty grams of
protein and one gram of total fat.
40 The dietitian’s answer—to the effect it might cause a religious believer on the fence to eat
the lobster because of its healthy qualities—may have the effect of influencing the believer’s
religious practice, but this doesn’t make the answer religious any more than, for example, a
government policy outlawing all uses of peyote, including religious uses.
41 See text accompanying notes 24-28, supra.
42 For an extended consideration of the constitutional issues involved in teaching about
religion, see Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, Civic
Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1243-62 (2002).
43 Raelianism is a relatively new religious movement that believes aliens created the human
race 25,000 years ago. See The Raelians, http://www.carm.org/raelians.htm.
44 For an extended argument that schools should teach about religion, see Wexler, supra n.
42, at 1200-20.
39
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Things are very different, however, when schools propose to teach
ID in a science classroom as an alternative scientific theory to evolution. As
I have discussed elsewhere, the fact that science teachers generally do not
teach science objectively but rather present the best thinking in the field as
the current state of knowledge poses the significant risk that even wellintentioned teachers may end up leaving students with the impression that
ID is in fact true.45 This problem is exacerbated by the lack of adequate
materials for teachers to use to teach evolution and ID together in an
objective fashion.46 Most important, however, even a policy that urges
schools to use an objective approach to teaching about ID might constitute
an unconstitutional endorsement of religion, such that the very adoption of
the policy would be unconstitutional, even if teachers were able to teach
successfully about ID in an objective manner. Whether this would be the
case turns in large part on the proper understanding of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Edwards, to which the Essay now turns.
II. What About Edwards?
Professor Beckwith and I agree that the Supreme Court’s 1987
decision in Edwards v. Aguillard is the most important existing precedent for
evaluating the constitutionality of teaching ID in public schools, but we
disagree on which way the case points.47 In Edwards, the Court struck down
Louisiana’s attempt to require its schools to teach both creation science and
evolution whenever they taught one of those subjects. The Court found that
the statute was animated by an improper religious purpose. In my view, the
Court emphasized four problems with the Louisiana creation science equal
time statute which are relevant to addressing the constitutionality of any ID
policy: (1) the poor fit between the means of the statute and its ends (the goal
of promoting academic freedom); (2) the historic link between religion and
See Wexler, supra n. 7, at 821.
See id. at 822.
47 As I have explained elsewhere, I think that the Edwards case is relevant to understanding
not only how the Court might review an ID policy’s purpose, but also how it would review
the claim that an ID policy endorsed religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The
Court in Edwards considered the former and not the latter, but it seems that the same factors
that led it to conclude that the legislature there had no secular purpose would also have led it
to conclude that the statute endorsed religion. See Wexler, supra n. 7, at 827. Thus, I analyze
the same factors for both possible constitutional objections. My personal belief is that the
endorsement analysis is superior to the religious purpose analysis in a case in which the
legislature articulates a secular purpose.
Of course, the Court’s recent decision in Van Orden v. Perry, No. 03-1500, slip op.
(2000), particularly Justice Breyer’s controlling concurrence in that case, in which he writes
that there is “no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment,” id. at 3 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment), casts some doubt on the state of the law in the area of government
sponsorship or endorsement of religion. Without further elucidation from the Court or
Justice Breyer, however, I would suggest that the same analysis provided in this Essay would
apply to the sort of “know it when I see it” approach of Justice Breyer as well as to a
purpose or endorsement approach.
45
46
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critiques of evolution; (3) the singling out of evolution from among all
possible topics of reform; and (4) statements from the legislative history
indicating an intent to promote religion. All of these factors are present in
the ID controversy.48 Stated in a very strong form, the constitutional case
against ID can be phrased in terms of these four factors as follows: Against
a long visible historic background of obviously religious opposition to the
teaching of evolution, once again another movement arrives that often
speaks in very religious terms and singles out evolution from among all
topics in the school curriculum for change, in order to achieve the purported
goal of informing students about a significant scientific controversy when in
fact no such controversy exists. What message does a school send to the
reasonable observer if it embraces such a movement? It seems likely that the
received message would be that the government is reforming the curriculum
for religious reasons, which is exactly what the Court in Edwards said the
government cannot do.49
For Beckwith, Edwards supports the constitutionality of teaching ID
because (1) ID is historically and textually distinguishable from Genesis’s
accounts of creation as well as the creation science involved in Edwards; and
(2) the Supreme Court in Edwards recognized that teaching scientific
alternatives to evolution for some secular purpose might be legitimate.50 I
disagree that either of these arguments help the legal case for teaching ID.
A.

Historic Taint

On the first of these arguments, Beckwith contends that “ID’s
intellectual pedigree is of a different order than the creation science the Court
repudiated in Edwards.”51 He notes that “ID is neither historically connected
to Scopes nor is its literature . . . transparently derived from the Book of
Genesis.”52 Furthermore, he describes as “patently unreasonable”53 my
purported claim “that because ID has some historical connection to the
creation/evolution controversy, it would not pass the Edwards standard,”54
and accuses me of making “the genetic fallacy a principle of constitutional
jurisprudence.”55
To clarify, my position has never been that schools are barred from
teaching any subject or theory that bears some historical connection to
See id. at 826-27.
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987).
50 BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 154-64.
51 Id. at 154.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. According to Beckwith, “The genetic fallacy occurs when the origin of a viewpoint or
argument, rather than its merits, is employed to dismiss it out of hand.” Id. at 171 n. 67. I
believe that it is quite clear that I did not dismiss any argument “out of hand” but rather
dismissed it on the basis of sound analysis.
48
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religion.56 Indeed, I have argued at length that schools can and should teach
about religion,57 an argument that would make no sense if I really wanted to
make the genetic fallacy a principle of first amendment law, for what could
be more closely related to religion than religion itself? Far from arguing that
teaching ID is unconstitutional simply because it has some historical
connection to the long-standing controversy over evolution, my argument
rather is that under the Supreme Court’s endorsement test,58 singling out
evolution from all the topics in the school curriculum for reform by teaching
students a purportedly scientific critique of evolution that has no support
within the scientific community will likely be understood by a reasonable
observer as continuing the long tradition of trying to reform the school
curriculum to promote a religious belief.
Beckwith is correct that ID is somewhat different from creation
science and its previous iterations. ID is based on purportedly scientific
theories and explanations for observed data, such as William Dembski’s
notion of an explanatory filter to detect the existence of design in natural
systems59 and Michael Behe’s theory of irreducible complexity that claims
certain biological systems are too complex to have come into existence
through evolutionary processes alone.60 Of course, both Dembski’s and
Behe’s arguments have been widely critiqued,61 but this does not mean that
ID theory is the exact same system of thought as the creation science put
forward in Edwards. By itself, however, this means little. There may be some
areas of law in which a party may be able to make small adjustments to its
practices to fall outside the letter of a legal prohibition, but constitutional
law, and certainly First Amendment law, is not one of them. For better or
See, e.g., Wexler, supra n. 1, at 464-65 (arguing that a particular iteration of intelligent design
would fail the endorsement test for a variety of reasons, including historic similarities to past
practices).
57 See generally Wexler, supra n. 42.
58 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (adopting the endorsement test first articulated by Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Lynch). The Court recently reiterated the endorsement standard in striking down displays of
the Ten Commandments in the courthouses of two Kentucky counties. See McCreary
County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, Slip Op. No. 03-1693, at
19-21; id. at 3 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
59 See WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE THROUGH
SMALL PROBABILITIES (1998).
60 SEE MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO
EVOLUTion (1996).
61
On Behe, see, e.g., Kenneth Miller, Review of Darwin’s Black Box, 16
36
(1996),
available
at
CREATION/EVOLUTION
http://biomed.brown.edu/Faculty/M/Miller/Behe.html; H. Allen Orr, Darwin v. Intelligent
Design (Again), BOSTON REV., Dec. 1996/Jan. 1997; see generally Behe’s Empty Box,
http://www.simonyi.ox.ac.uk/dawkins/WorldOfDawkins-archive/Catalano/box/
behe.shtml#reviews (collecting reviews). On Dembski, see, e.g., Massimo Pigliucci, Chance,
Necessity, and the War Against Science, 50 BIOSCIENCE 79 (2000); Branden Fitelson, Eliot Sober
& Elliott Sober, How Not to Detect Design—A Review of William Dembski’s The Design
Inference, 66 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 472 (1999).
56
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for worse, the Court has created an Establishment Clause doctrine that
requires courts to use common sense to figure out what message the
government sends through its actions.62 This, in turn, requires courts to seek
to understand, with some sensitivity, the entire context of the challenged
practice.63 As the Supreme Court has made clear, one of the most important
elements of this context is the practice’s historical background, which in the
case of ID,64 means the entire history of religious opposition to evolution.
The fact that the ID movement is different in some senses from the
iterations that came before it does not demonstrate that it is not in important
senses the same: it has very close religious cognates (Paley’s 19th century
argument65); it singles out evolution from among all topics in the curriculum;
it contends that evolution is too materialistic and naturalistic; it uses the same
kind of language and discourse to attack evolution as previous religious
attempts to discredit evolution;66 its audience is overwhelmingly constituted
by adherents of traditional religions;67 it argues that a supernatural entity
created all of mankind, which is what Edwards said was so problematic about
creation science;68 and its leaders and implementers are generally very
religious and often speak in explicitly religious terms.69 Putting all of these
factors together, the reasonable observer viewing the introduction of ID into
the public school curriculum would likely identify ID with a specific religious
project.
To return to Beckwith’s criticism of my position, then, might it be
the case that at least as a practical matter, my approach to ID would make it
impossible for those who seek to reform the public school curriculum’s
Of course, the Court’s endorsement test has been widely criticized by scholars. See, e.g.,
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No
Endorsement Test,” 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 117-34 (1992).
63 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595-97 (Blackmun, J.).
64 See id. at 629-31 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
65 See WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY (1845).
66 See Wexler, supra n. __, at 464-65 (arguing that the ID textbook, Of Pandas and People, uses
the same anti-evolution arguments as previous anti-evolution iterations).
67 See, e.g., Memorandum from Rebecca Wittman to Mark Edwards, Re: Zogby America Report,
www.discovery.org/articleFiles/PDFs/ZogbyFinalReport.pdf (Sept. 21, 2001) (reporting
that overwhelming majority of those questioned who believe in intelligent design and the
teaching
of
intelligent
design
are
Protestants);
Zogby
Poll,
www.nmidnet.org/OhioZogbyPoll.pdf (May 8, 2002) (reporting that 80% of those Ohioans
questioned who strongly agree with the notion that students should learn about scientific
evidence in favor of intelligent design are Catholic or Protestant); Survey: Protestants Support
26,
2005, available
at
Intelligent Design,
THE CHRISTIAN POST, May
http://www.christianpost.com/article/education/822/full/survey.protestants.back.intelligen
t.design/1.htm (poll reports that among doctors most proponents of intelligent design are
Protestant).
68 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591-92.
69 For an account of the religious views and discourse of ID supporters, see, e.g., BARBARA
FORREST & PAUL GROSS, CREATIONISM’S TROJAN HORSE: THE WEDGE OF INTELLIGENT
DESIGN 15-33 (2004).
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presentation of science and religion to make any significant impact on that
curriculum? Have I placed an insurmountable barrier in front of those who
oppose evolution and support religious views on origins? Will reforms
invariably be tainted by their historical associations? I do not think so. It is
true that because of the long and very visible history of religious opposition
to evolution, opponents of the way our public schools teach science and
religion will have to make special efforts to disassociate themselves from
what has gone before in order to defuse the message that they are sending
with their reforms. For one thing, if any reform is to pass constitutional
muster, it will probably have to go beyond singling out evolution to address a
broader subsection of the curriculum. But this does not mean that reform is
impossible. For example, schools would most likely fall within constitutional
limits if they taught a wide variety of minority views in science as a way of
teaching students how the scientific process works, taught about religion and
religious views on origins (including creation stories from different cultures
and traditions, in addition to the Biblical ones) in history or comparative
religion classes, or taught about the evolution controversy in history or
current affairs classes.
B.

Secular Purposes.

Beckwith’s second argument regarding Edwards is that the case
establishes that public schools can teach ID so long as they do so to further
some secular purpose.70 This argument, too, does not win Beckwith the day.
Two preliminary points are worth making before exploring the four specific
secular purposes that Beckwith proposes could animate an ID policy. First,
of course, although a secular purpose is a necessary condition for a policy’s
constitutionality, it is not a sufficient one. A statute or regulation or any
other form of government action may be unconstitutional, even though it is
animated by a secular purpose, if it advances or promotes or endorses
religion.71 Indeed, in most cases in which the Court has invalidated
government activity under the Establishment Clause, it has done so even
after finding the activity supported by some secular purpose.72 Second,
Edwards clearly demonstrates that, at least in the area of teaching evolution in
the public schools, the Court will not accept uncritically the government’s
recitation of a secular purpose. Instead, the Court (and lower courts
faithfully following Supreme Court precedent) will examine the actual
relationship between the means of the policy and the purported secular goal
of the policy to test whether that purported secular goal is in fact the real
purpose underlying the policy. If the relationship between the means and
See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 156.
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (proceeding to analyze
effects of voucher program after concluding that the program was enacted to serve a secular
purpose).
72 See Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV.
173, 329 (2002) (“While a few cases have been decided under the religious purpose element,
the overwhelming number of Establishment Clause cases coming before the Court have
been decided under the religious effect element.”).
70
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ends is too attenuated, the Court will not hesitate to find the policy
unconstitutional.73
Beckwith argues that a government body could adopt an ID policy
for one of four possible secular purposes: (1) to introduce students to an
important new body of scholarship;74 (2) to “enhanc[e] and protec[t] the
academic freedom of teachers and students” who support ID or disagree
with evolution;75 (3) to erase the perception that the curriculum favors, or
endorses, an irreligious point of view;76 and (4) to maintain neutrality
between religious belief and non-belief.77 The following discussion treats
these four purposes in turn, grouping the latter two together because of their
similarity. In each case, the discussion addresses both whether courts should
view these purposes as sincere and whether a policy adopted pursuant to
such a purported secular purpose would likely advance or endorse religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause, despite that purpose.
1.

Introducing Students to Important Scholarship

Beckwith first argues that schools could defend an ID policy on the
basis that they are introducing students to an important body of scholarship.
Citing the Court’s statement in Edwards that “teaching a variety of scientific
theories about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly
done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science
instruction,”78 Beckwith argues that “[a] state could appeal to the importance
of exposing students to reputable scholarship that critiques the
methodological naturalism behind naturalistic evolution and the ontological
materialism entailed by it.”79 The notion that schools can teach students ID
to introduce them to a new and important body of scholarship suffers,
however, from the same flaw that the creation science statute in Edwards
itself suffered—namely a significant gap between the means and ends of the
policy. Because there is no significant scientific disagreement about the basic
soundness of evolution and the weakness of ID as a scientific theory,80 courts
reviewing an ID policy justified on the grounds that the policy is intended to
introduce students to an important body of scholarship may very well be
correct to find that the purpose is in fact a sham or that the policy endorses
religion despite the articulated purpose.

See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-90. This could be either because the Court finds that the
legislative purpose is in fact religious, or because it finds that the policy endorses religion.
74 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 160. I have changed the order of the four secular
purposes to facilitate my discussion. His order puts numbers 3-4 before numbers 1-2.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 156.
77 Id. at 157-60.
78 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594.
79 BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 160.
80 See text accompanying notes 81-85, infra.
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Unlike evolutionary theory, which the scientific community widely
supports and believes to be one of the most important, central, and robust
theories in all of biology (if not all of science),81 ID theory has been roundly
rejected by mainstream scientists.82 Although scientist Michael Behe’s
foundational ID book, Darwin’s Black Box, has been sporadically cited in the
scientific literature, for the most part ID theory has been completely absent
from the peer reviewed literature.83 For example, one very recent study
showed that only seventeen articles cited any ID terms in an ID-specific
sense, and some of those citations came in the context of criticism of those
concepts.84 As Professors Brauer, Forrest, and Gey have persuasively
demonstrated, the status of ID theory in the scientific literature pales in
comparison even to the widely rejected theory that the HIV virus does not in
fact cause AIDS.85
In his defense of ID’s importance, Beckwith notes that the theory
has been the subject of much popular and journalistic writing and even
academic reviews, responses, symposia, and conferences.86 This is hardly
surprising, however, given that ID is undoubtedly an important social,
cultural, political, and even religious phenomenon, but it is also entirely
irrelevant to the idea’s status as a scientific theory. Journalists write about
ID, and academics discuss and respond to the claims of ID not because ID
has attained any success within the scientific community but because it has
gained hold among religious conservatives and politicians and thus has
helped reshape the cultural and educational landscape in important ways.
Indeed, it may even be accurate to describe some of ID’s success in the
popular literature as owing much to ID’s scientific shortcomings rather than
its strengths; one aspect of ID that might have attracted journalistic attention
is the success the theory has attained among politicians and the public despite
its failure among scientists.
Beckwith intriguingly argues that the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.87 suggests that success in the peer
review process should not be considered highly relevant in assessing a
theory’s scientific merits.88 In that case, the Court held that Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence did not limit scientific expert testimony to those
theories that have become “generally accepted” in the scientific community,89
as the then Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had previously
held in a 1923 case called Frye v. United States,90 which pre-dated the adoption
For a collection of citations on this point, see Wexler, supra n. 7, at 804-05, nn. 234-35.
See id. at 805-07, n. 236.
83 See id. at 807, n. 237.
84 See Brauer, et al., supra n. 36, at __.
85 See id. at __.
86 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at xiii-xvii.
87 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
88 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 23.
89 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
90 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
81
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of the Federal Rules. Because the Court noted in Daubert that peer review
acceptance “is not a sine qua non of admissibility” and “does not necessarily
correlate with reliability,”91 Beckwith concludes that the test of ID’s scientific
legitimacy should turn on “arguments and their soundness” and not their
“popularity.”92
Though the argument is inspired, Daubert in fact provides no support
for ID’s constitutionality. For one thing, the Court did recognize the
importance of peer review, when it wrote that, “submission to the scrutiny of
the scientific community is a component of ‘good science,’ in part because it
increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be
detected.”93 Moreover, to the degree that ID is animated by a rejection of
methodological naturalism, or the scientific method, Daubert undermined the
scientific legitimacy of ID when it explained that the “scientific knowledge”
standard of Rule 702 “establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability” and
that “to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific method.”94
More importantly, because Daubert concerns a fundamentally
different issue than whether public schools can constitutionally teach ID, it
actually—when understood correctly—hurts the case for ID’s
constitutionality. In Daubert, the Court held that Rule 702 allows the
introduction of some expert scientific testimony into federal court even
though the proffered science is not “generally accepted.” In reaching this
conclusion, the Court engaged in a run-of-the-mill statutory interpretation
exercise, and it found that Congress, through its enactment of Rule 702, had
intended to broaden the range of evidence allowed into federal courts
substantially beyond that which previously was allowed.95 Because Congress
had intended to allow this broad range of evidence into the federal courts,
the Court concluded that even evidence which had not been subject to
extensive peer review could be admitted into court.96 Thus, if Daubert stands
for any general principle regarding the prerequisite of peer review, it stands
for the notion that if there is a general rule which seeks to allow a very broad
range of evidence into a forum, then peer review need not be required as a
prerequisite for admission.
Public school classrooms, however, are entirely different from federal
courtrooms. In public schools, the general standard of admissibility for the
discussion of scientific theories in science classes is far stricter than Rule

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 23.
93 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
94 Id. at 590.
95 See id. at 589 (“Given the Rules’ permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule
on expert testimony that does not mention ‘general acceptance, the assertion that the Rules
somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing.”).
96 See id. at 593.
91
92
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702.97 Schools generally teach only the best, most-settled scientific
theories—the ones that have gained the greatest foothold in the profession
and are the most robust and persuasive theories in their field—rather than
teaching any theory that can lay any claim at all to plausibility.98 Public
school science classrooms are thus governed not by a liberal admission rule
like Rule 702 but by a rule, customary though it may be, that is even stricter
than the Frye rule that preceded Rule 702. Thus, Daubert is completely
inapplicable to the ID context, and indeed can be read to undermine the case
for ID’s constitutionality, to the extent that it suggests non-peer reviewed
theories should only be allowed into a forum if some governing authority
specifically provides for extremely broad admission of evidence.
Because the authority in the public school context is of course set by
custom or school policy (whether formal or informal) and can thus be altered
by the school itself, one could read Daubert as lending some support to a
school that wanted to broaden what types of theories it teaches students
generally. For example, if a school decided that it would no longer restrict
itself to teaching the most successful scientific theories but would also begin
discussing as possibly true a variety of minority or fringe theories, it could
plausibly point to the Supreme Court’s language in Daubert as support. It
could, for instance, as a rhetorical matter, say to parents and the community
that, “Hey, the Supreme Court has allowed fringe theories into the federal
courts, why shouldn’t we be able to allow fringe theories into the
classrooms?”99 But that, of course, is not what the ID proponents want to
do. They do not suggest that schools change their approach to teaching
science generally; rather, they argue that schools should make an exception to
their general strict admission rules in the one isolated instance of ID. If a
school generally operates under the principle that it will only teach students
about the best scientific theories, the ones that have fared the best under the
rigorous peer review process that is at the heart of the scientific professions,
and it then makes a single exception to allow its teachers to teach about one
theory that has been entirely unsuccessful under that process, then
reasonable observers would likely understand that the school has decided to
teach that one theory for some reason other than to teach students about a
new and important body of scientific scholarship.
2.

Protecting Academic Freedom

97 That the standard is more than likely set by custom, rather than rule, does not make it less
important for these purposes.
98 See Wexler, supra n. 7, at 821.
99 To be consistent with federal court practice, the school would have to add the very
important caveat that it would also teach students about how mainstream science has
critiqued the relevant fringe theory. One of the basic premises of federal evidence law is that
anything introduced into a courtroom can be tested and subjected to critique by the other
party. This could be a problem for ID, to the extent that a school allows the teaching of ID
but does not require that students be made aware of ID’s failure to succeed in the scientific
community and of the numerous critiques of ID theory as terrible science.
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Second, pointing to a number of instances in which ID supporters
were met with “marginalization, hostility, and public ridicule because of their
support of ID and/or doubts about [evolution],”100 Beckwith argues that
schools could defend an ID policy on the basis that they are protecting the
academic freedom of their teachers and students. Beckwith suggests that
public school teachers in fact possess a first amendment right to exercise
their academic freedom by introducing ID,101 and that a policy recognizing
this right would “simply be affirming by statute or written policy what is
already a fixed point in constitutional law,”102 but in fact public school
teachers possess no such constitutional right, as will be discussed below.103
Nonetheless, even in the absence of such a right, one could perhaps imagine a
school wanting to enact an ID policy for the purpose of promoting the
academic freedom interests of its teachers.
This argument, however, is unpersuasive, although the precise reason
for its lack of persuasiveness differs depending on what policy the school
already takes towards allowing teachers to introduce materials of their own
choosing into the classroom. If the school already places no limits on what
the teacher can introduce as a general matter, then a policy that specifically
allows the teaching of ID cannot plausibly be said to be promoting the
academic freedom of teachers, since they already possess that freedom as a
matter of underlying policy. This is precisely what happened in Edwards,
where the Court held that the Louisiana statute could not possibly have
furthered the state’s purported interest in promoting academic freedom since
nothing prevented the teachers from exercising that freedom in the first
place.104
On the other hand, if the underlying school policy restricts teachers
from teaching material that is not specifically included in the curriculum, then
Beckwith’s rationale makes somewhat more sense, in that at least the school
would be allowing teachers to teach something they would otherwise not be
able to teach. However, like Beckwith’s first argument, this one too suffers
from a substantial disconnect between means and ends. If the true interest
of the state or school board or school was really to promote the academic
freedom of teachers who want to introduce controversial topics into the
classroom, why would it implement a policy that provides an exception to
the general “no teaching material not specifically included in the curriculum”
BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 160.
See id. at 73-76.
102 Id. at 163.
103 See text accompanying notes 138-157, infra.
104 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587 (“The Act does not grant teachers a flexibility that they did
not already possess to supplant the present science curriculum with the presentation of
theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life. Indeed, the Court of Appeals found that
no law prohibited Louisiana public school teachers from teaching any scientific theory.”).
Moreover, for similar reasons, ID policies cannot be justified on grounds that they further
the academic freedom of students, as presumably no government policy exists that would
prohibit students from learning about ID on their own if they so choose.
100
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rule only in the context of teaching about alternatives to evolution, and not in
the myriad other contexts in which it might be appropriate?
The only plausible reason to adopt such a limited policy would be
either that ID supporters suffer disproportionately more (or more severe)
hostility than holders of other unpopular beliefs or that hostility over ID is
more troubling than the same type and amount of hostility toward other
unpopular beliefs. The latter seems constitutionally problematic, in that it
would represent a judgment by the public school that ID is normatively more
worthy than other beliefs, and the former seems implausible. Polls
consistently show that the great majority of Americans believe that an
intelligent designer exists and that more than half reject evolution and believe
God created human beings in essentially their current form.105 Surely there
are beliefs held by substantially less than half of the population that would
also require protection by a state that is truly interested in protecting the
interests of teachers to introduce unpopular subjects and perspectives. What
about the teacher who wants to discuss in class his belief that there is no
God, or that using drugs is mind-expanding, or that having sex with many
partners is particularly fun, or that the Holocaust never occurred, or that
gender inequality is justified? If the school really wants to protect the
academic freedom interests of teachers who hold unpopular beliefs, wouldn’t
it protect at least some of these teachers as well as the one that wants to
discuss ID theory?106
Of course, there is no general legal requirement that government
actors attempt to solve problems comprehensively, as opposed to
incrementally.107 That is, as a general matter, nothing would prohibit a school
from promoting the academic freedom of its teachers in one area but not
others, even if it would make sense for the school to promote academic
freedom in all areas equally. The problem for ID advocates is the
Establishment Clause, and particularly the Court’s analysis in Edwards, as well
as the Court’s endorsement test, understood in light of that case. Edwards
says that at least in the area of teaching evolution and its alternatives, courts
must look closely to the relationship between means and ends in evaluating
whether an articulated purpose is actually a sham;108 in other words, the
Court has shifted the burden to evolution opponents to enact changes to the
See,
e.g.,
CBS
News
Poll,
Poll:
Creationism
Trumps
Evolution,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/22/opinion/polls/main657083.shtml (Nov. 22,
2004) (reporting that 55% of all Americans believe “God created humans in present form”
and another 27% believe that “Humans Evolved, God guided the process”)
106 This would seem particularly true in light of poll results that show that almost two-thirds
of Americans would like creationism taught alongside evolution in the public schools.
107 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 433 (1955) (“Evils in the same field may be
of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature
may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one
phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.” (citations omitted)).
108 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-88.
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school curriculum in such a way that the court is convinced that the real
motive for change is not to promote a particular religious viewpoint. To put
it another way, a court will likely find that a policy in this area that at all
resembles past unconstitutional policies will send a message of endorsement,
unless the advocates for change make special efforts to defuse that message.
The fact that there’s no particular reason to promote or protect academic
freedom with respect to ID as opposed to other controversial topics weighs
heavily in favor of finding a policy backed by the academic freedom rationale
to be unconstitutional.
3.

Promoting Neutrality and Erasing Endorsement

Finally, Beckwith contends that schools might teach ID either to
“erase [the] perception” “that a certain disputed, irreligious point of view is
favored,”109 or to ensure that by balancing the teaching of evolution (which
“presupposes a controversial epistemology . . . entails a controversial
metaphysics . . . and is antithetical to traditional religious belief”) with ID, it
will “remain neutral . . . between religion and irreligion.”110 These two
arguments are worth treating together, because they both basically assert the
same thing, although in slightly different terms.111 Both suggest that the state
acts with a secular purpose when it enacts a policy intended to restore
balance to a school curriculum that in some way disadvantages religious
points of view. This is certainly an interesting argument, and it will take a bit
of a detour through the current state of church-state law to understand why
the argument ultimately fails.
Government neutrality towards religion and non-religion of course
sounds like a laudable goal. Why should the government intentionally take a
position that is harmful to religious belief or practice? More specifically, it
perhaps seems unfair and overly intrusive at first glance for a public school
to send a message that is at odds with somebody’s sincere religious beliefs?
On closer look, however, it becomes quite apparent that true substantive
neutrality towards religion is impossible. The key to understanding this point
is to recognize both the numerous ways that the government takes positions
in public life and the countless viewpoints embraced by the numerous
religious groups that populate the nation.
The government takes positions in all sorts of ways in its everyday
operations, through everything from the speeches of public officials to the
funding of certain groups and viewpoints to the monuments it establishes on
public property to the criminal and regulatory laws it promulgates to the
curricula adopted by public schools. Because the country is so religiously
diverse, these government positions inevitably conflict with at least

BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 156.
Id at 157.
111 Even Professor Beckwith says that the two arguments are substantially the same. See id.
109
110
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somebody’s religious viewpoint. For example, some112 Quakers are pacifists;
some Christian scientists do not believe in conventional medicine; some
Mormons believe in polygamy; groups like The Creativity Movement
(formerly the Church of the World Creator) and the Christian Identity preach
violence against blacks and Jews;113 some people believe that the Bible
establishes that the Earth is flat;114 The Church of Satan believes in
indulgence, vengeance, and engaging in sins for purposes of gratification;115
Raelians believe that aliens created the human race about 25,000 years ago;116
some practitioners of Vodun (commonly referred to as Voodoo) believe that
dead people can be revived after being buried;117 some Wiccans believe that
they can communicate with the dead through séances;118 some Jains believe it
is wrong to kill any living thing at all, including bugs and vegetables,119 and
may wear masks to avoid breathing in microscopic organisms;120 and some
adherents of Falun Gong believe they can harness their life force to cure
illnesses, see into other worlds, move objects by telekinesis, walk through
walls, and fly.121
It is certainly not the case that the government, in the messages it
sends, must be neutral with respect to all of these religious beliefs. For
example, the state can take the position that racial intolerance and violence is
wrong, that eating vegetables is not a sin, that the world is round, that people
ought not to be vengeful, that war is sometimes justified, that it is wrong to
marry more than one person, that conventional medicine works, and that it is
impossible to walk through walls and fly, no matter how well one manages
his or her life force. The government can punish hate crimes, run public
service ads urging citizens to eat their vegetables (or create a food pyramid to
Just to emphasize this caveat to the following list, my point here is only that there are
some (perhaps only a few) members of each religion listed that believe in the noted practice,
not that every member believes in the practice. The citations provided, concededly
superficial in nature, are not meant to establish anything more than this limited (but
important) point.
113
For information on these two groups, see, e.g., The Creativity Movement,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/wcotc.htm (last visited June 22, 2005); Christian Identity
Movement, http://www.religioustolerance.org/cr_ident.htm (last visited June 22, 2005).
114 See, e.g., Robert P.J. Day, Documenting the Existence of “The International Flat Earth Society,”
http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/flatearth.html (1993) (last visited June 22, 2005).
115 See http://www.churchofsatan.com/home.html (“The Nine Satanic Statements”) (last
visited June 22, 2005).
116 See http://www.rael.org/rael_content/rael_summary.php (last visited June 22, 2005).
117 See Vodun (and related religions), http://www.religioustolerance.org/voodoo.htm (“One
belief unique to Vodun is that a dead person can be revived after having been buried.”).
118
See, e.g., Hanna Nichols, Paganism and the Search for Truth and Proof,
http://www.iamnext.com/spirituality/paganism.html (2004) (noting that modern Wiccans
still engage in the practice of communicating with the dead through séances).
119 See Jain Dharma, a.k.a. Jainism, http://www.religioustolerance.org/jainism.htm (last visited
June 22, 2005).
120 See Jainism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jainism (last visited June 22, 2005).
121 See, e.g., David Van Biema, The Man With the Qi,, TIME MAGAZINE, May 10, 1999
(Interview with Li Hongzhi). Of course, whether Falun Gong constitutes a religion for
constitutional purposes is an open question.
112
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this effect), employ navigation systems that assume a spherical Earth, preach
kindness and tolerance toward others, engage in war, criminalize polygamy,
fund conventional medicine, and teach in its schools that people cannot fly
(and indeed give detention to students who try).122
The Supreme Court used to recognize that the Free Exercise Clause
placed some limits on the government’s ability to burden religious believers
through its actions. Prior to 1990, the Court applied so-called strict scrutiny
to government action that placed substantial burdens on religious belief and
practice,123 although this scrutiny was often rather less than strict in
practice.124 During this period, the remedy granted by the Court to believers
who were substantially burdened in the absence of any compelling
government interest was an individual exemption from the government law
or action, not an injunction against the government law or action itself.125
Thus, even though the Court found that Wisconsin’s compulsory education
requirement was unconstitutional with respect to certain Amish parents who
believed their children should not have to attend public school after the age
of fifteen, the Court’s remedy was to give the plaintiffs an exemption from
the education law, rather than striking down the law itself.126 Even this
limited remedy, however, no longer exists under the First Amendment, ever
since the Court decided in the (in)famous Smith case that the Free Exercise
Clause does not prohibit the government from imposing substantial burdens
on religious belief and practice through the application of neutral laws of
general applicability. 127
The Constitution presumably places some limit on the state’s authority to explicitly
criticize religion generally or a particular religion, through the Supreme Court’s somewhat
incoherent and certainly unexplored “disapproval” prong of the endorsement test. See Board
of Educ. V. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (“Because the Act on its face grants equal
access to both secular and religious speech, we think it clear that the Act’s purpose was not
to ‘endorse or disapprove of religion.’”). But as Smith implies, a general law or practice that
burdens religion somehow does not by itself constitute an unconstitutional disapproval of
religion. Perhaps an explicit statement from the state to the effect that the religion in
question is clearly wrong to believe what it believes would be unconstitutional, but the
examples provided here do not rise to that level.
123 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
124 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting Free Exercise claim of
soldier to wear yarmulke against military regulation because of special military context); Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (rejecting claim of
Native Americans that the Forest Service’s plan to destroy sacred forest would violate their
Free Exercise rights).
125 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
126 See id.
127 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Court has provided that
certain laws burdening religion will continue to get strict scrutiny, including laws falling
directly under the Sherbert line of cases, id. at 880, so-called hybrid claims involving the Free
Exercise Clause and some other constitutional right, id. (distinguishing Yoder), and laws that
are not truly neutral or generally applicable, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking down local Florida ordinances for targeting the
Santeria practice of animal sacrifice). Also, the Court has recently upheld against an
Establishment Clause attack the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), which provides for strict scrutiny review of laws that burden religious practice
122
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Thus, after Smith, a religious believer who is burdened by a neutral
and general government action, policy, or law cannot claim a violation of his
or her Free Exercise rights. Instead, the believer is restricted to pursuing a
legislative accommodation. The state, if it so chooses, may grant the believer
an exemption from the generally applicable law through legislation, subject to
some constitutional limits articulated by the Supreme Court.128 These
Establishment Clause limits require that the accommodation relieve a
substantial burden imposed on the believer by the state; that the
accommodation has a limited negative effect on nonbeneficiaries; and,
importantly, that the accommodation be denominationally neutral to the
extent possible.129 On this last point, then-Professor Michael McConnell has
explained that, “An accommodation must not favor one form of religious
belief over another. Since the objective of religious accommodations is to
enhance the freedom of choice, religious pluralism demands that, where
possible, the government’s actions must not be permitted to affect the
previously existing religious mix.”130
What, then, does all this have to do with Beckwith’s suggestion that a
school might insulate itself from constitutional attack by enacting an ID
policy with the goal of promoting neutrality in the school curriculum (or
erasing the endorsement of irreligion in that curriculum)? For one thing, it
makes it quite clear that Beckwith is wrong to the extent his arguments imply
that public schools are constitutionally required to teach ID in order to
maintain neutrality.131 Beckwith is not alone in suggesting that the public
school curriculum must be viewpoint neutral with respect to religion; many
other thinkers and jurists have said the same thing.132 The argument,
in certain contexts, such as prisons that receive federal funds. Cutter v. Wilkinson, Slip Op.
No. 03-9877 (May 31, 2005).
128 See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (rejecting Establishment Clause attack on exemption
from Title VII’s ban on religious discrimination in hiring for religious organizations).
129 See, e.g., Cutter, Slip Op., at 9-10 (discussing these three constitutional requirements).
130 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
131 I think that Beckwith’s language implies exactly this when he writes that: “[A]n ID statute
could be justified on the basis of neutrality by arguing that to teach only one theory of
origins . . . the state is in fact advocating, aiding, fostering, and promoting irreligion, which it
is constitutionally forbidden from doing.” Id. at 157 (emphasis added). This suggests that an ID
statute is arguably constitutionally necessary to dispel the constitutionally forbidden message
that is currently being sent by the public schools. On the other hand, Beckwith has publicly
stated that he does not think that public schools should, as a policy matter, at this point of
time, teach ID, which suggests that he does not think that public schools must teach ID to
maintain neutrality. See http://pharyngula.org/comments/495_0_1_0_C/ (Beckwith claiming
that he “has no horse in this race”). To my mind, however, this latter position is in some
tension with what he has written regarding viewpoint neutrality and the public school
curriculum.
132 See, e.g, WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION & AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A
NATIONAL DILEMMA 243 (1995) (“The Court has given public schools permission to teach
about religion, but it has never claimed that religion must be taught to restore neutrality to a
curriculum that is hostile to religion. Yet, this should be its position.”); id at 8, 131, 378
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however, is completely unworkable, ignores the fact that there are many
religions rather than just one, and misapprehends the nature of public
schooling, which takes all sorts of positions on all types of important public
issues in almost everything it does. If the argument were true, schools would
have to teach racial hatred, flat earth theory, and flying in addition to ID to
make sure they were not being non-neutral with respect to students who
happen to believe in these things. Such a course is obviously undesirable and
not required by the First Amendment.
The more important question is whether the state of the law affects
either the secular purpose analysis or the endorsement analysis of an ID
policy justified by such endorsement-erasing or neutrality-promoting
concerns.
Should such a purpose be considered secular for First
Amendment purposes? Would articulation of this purpose truly erase any
endorsement of religion under the Establishment Clause? These are difficult
questions, but ultimately the non-neutrality/endorsement purpose cannot
save ID policies from constitutional infirmity. Assuming for the sake of
argument that such a purpose would pass scrutiny as a secular purpose under
the very strict approach embodied by the Court in Edwards, an ID policy
would still likely endorse religion even if it is put forward specifically as a way
of balancing the curriculum between religion and non-religion.
As with Beckwith’s two other possible secular purposes, this one too
fails because of the looseness of the means-ends connection, which in fact
strengthens the endorsement message that an ID policy would send, rather
than erasing it. Teaching ID as a way of promoting the neutrality of the
public school curriculum is patently underinclusive with respect to that goal.
As explained above, the state acts non-neutrally with regard to religious views
of all sorts, in all types of ways. If neutrality is really the goal, why would
policy-makers focus only on one specific way in which the state’s messages
are non-neutral? Indeed, an ID policy would not even address the nonneutrality issue in the limited setting of the public school curriculum, much
less in the sphere of government activity as a whole. An ID policy justified
on neutrality or anti-endorsement grounds would in fact promote the specific
religious belief in monotheism as compared to the myriad other religious
beliefs that are treated in a non-neutral fashion by the state. Such a policy
would send the message that some instances of government non-neutrality
are more important than others, and that therefore some religious viewpoints
are more important than others. More specifically, such a policy, by teaching
ID but not polygamy, non-medical healing, or walking through walls (for
example), would favor the religious belief in monotheism over the beliefs
(making similar points); Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County
Public Schools, Mem. Order, Civil Action No. AW-05-1194, at p. 20-21 (May 5, 2005)
(Judge Alexander Williams, Jr. granting order enjoining a curriculum allegedly endorsing a
pro-gay lifestyle, in part on grounds that the curriculum presents only one view of a
controversial subject), available at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions152/Opinions/
CRC050505.pdf
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To see this more clearly, consider what would happen if the school
sought to deal with the religious opposition to evolution using the one
specific method approved (in some circumstances) by the Supreme Court: a
discretionary accommodation. If an ID supporter sought an accommodation
from the school board to allow his child to sit out the unit on evolution, and
the school granted the exemption, could the school then deny an exemption
to a Quaker who wanted her kids to sit out a discussion of why the Iraq war
is just or to a Christian Scientist who does not want his child to learn about
the terrific achievements of modern medicine? Assuming that the Quaker
and Christian Scientist claim that the lesson is offensive or troublesome in
basically the same way that the evolution-opponent claims, the school would
have no justification in granting one exemption but not the other. Such a
policy would run afoul of the requirement that accommodations be granted
in a denominationally-neutral fashion134 and violate the Court’s ruling in
Larson v. Valente that, “the clearest command of the EC is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”135 If a school
cannot selectively grant accommodations, why should it be able to sidestep
this prohibition by selectively altering the curriculum to favor one particular
religious belief on the grounds that doing so is necessary to maintain
neutrality?
The point here is not that the First Amendment generally bars
schools from altering the curriculum in small ways to maintain religious
neutrality. The point is ID specific; in light of all of ID’s other problems,
including its historical connection with previous unconstitutional efforts and
complete lack of support in the scientific community,136 enacting an ID
policy with the articulated goal of maintaining neutrality or erasing
endorsement in the school curriculum would not save the policy from
sending the message that the curriculum was in fact being altered to promote
a particular religious belief.137
See text accompanying notes 112-122, supra.
See Cutter, Slip Op., at 10 (observing that courts “must be satisfied that [an
accommodation’s] prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among different
faiths”).
135 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
136 See text accompanying notes 81-85, supra.
137 Under the rubric of preserving neutrality, Beckwith also argues that teaching ID might be
necessary to dispel the public school’s coercion of a non-religious viewpoint. See
BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 158-59 (“[P]ermitting or requiring public schools to
teach the alternative to naturalistic evolution—Intelligent Design—would be a way to ensure
that the Establishment Clause is not violated via the no coercion test.”). Beckwith relies on
the Court’s decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S 577 (1992), but that case is inapposite. Lee
stands for the notion that schools cannot coerce students into participating in religious
exercises, even by placing them in a situation in which the coercion actually results from peer
pressure, but the case says nothing about the government’s authority to place burdens on
religious believers, say by making them learn something that is at odds with their religious
133
134
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III.

Academic Freedom?

Finally, Beckwith argues that public school teachers have some
limited First Amendment academic freedom rights to teach ID in addition to
teaching the prescribed biology curriculum.138 Specifically, in commenting on
a Minnesota Court of Appeals decision called LeVake v. Independent School
District,139 Beckwith contends that “bringing into the classroom relevant
material that is supplementary to the curriculum (and not a violation of any
other legal duties), when the public school teacher has adequately fulfilled all
of her curricular obligations, is protected speech under the rubric of academic
freedom.”140 In support of this argument, Beckwith cites dictum from
Keyhishian v. Board of Regents,141 in which the Supreme Court opined that the
First Amendment “does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom,”142 as well as select quotations from other cases like Moore v.
Gaston County Board of Education143 and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,144 which are said to stand for the proposition that
teachers possess First Amendment academic freedom rights to supplement
the proscribed curriculum with their own materials and views.145
Beckwith is certainly correct in his claim that the First Amendment
places some limits on the state’s authority to fire government employees,
including public school teachers, and that those teachers do not forfeit their
First Amendment rights when they accept a government job. The Supreme
Court, in a case called Pickering v. Board of Education,146 has held that teachers
have a limited right (subject to a balancing test, in which the interest of the
beliefs. Indeed, in Smith, the Court held that the government is free to impose such burdens,
so long as it does so in a neutral and generally applicable manner. If a school wishes to
protect a student from such a burden, it may exempt him from the evolution lesson, so long
as it exempts other students from similar burdens on their religious beliefs, but attempting to
accommodate the ID believer by teaching ID fails for the same reason that the neutrality/
endorsement argument fails—it privileges ID compared to other religious viewpoints that
are disadvantaged by the curriculum.
138 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 73-76.
139 625 N.W.2d 502 (Minn Ct. App. 2001). Beckwith has written an entire essay about the
issues raised by this case. See Francis J. Beckwith, A Liberty Not Fully Evolved?, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1311 (2002).
140 BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 76. It is unclear what the phrase, “other legal
duties,” means here. I assume that it does not mean a clear school policy prohibiting any
discussion of ID, because only if such a policy existed would there be any need for a teacher
to assert a First Amendment academic freedom right in the first place.
141 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
142 Id. at 603.
143 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. N.C. 1973).
144 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker is particularly inapposite, since it concerned the speech rights
of the students in the school rather than the teachers.
145 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 74-76.
146 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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speaker is weighed against the relevant countervailing government interests)
to speak as citizens on matters of public concern without facing
employment-based retribution from their government employers.147 But this
right to speak out as citizens (for example, in newspaper editorials, meetings,
and other public forums outside the classroom) is entirely different from the
purported right to include material or views in the classroom against the
orders of the state, school board, or school authorities. This latter right
simply does not exist. It finds no support in Supreme Court precedent, is
contrary to existing law and common sense, would undermine the
democratic accountability of public schools, and would cause havoc in the
nation’s educational system.148
To begin with, the Court has never proclaimed any independent
“academic freedom” right for public secondary school teachers or anyone
else. Of course, the words “academic freedom” do not appear in the First
Amendment, or anywhere else in the Constitution, and although the phrase
can occasionally be found in Supreme Court dicta, the Court has never
invoked an academic freedom rationale to invalidate any government law or
practice and has never applied it at all to protect the rights of individuals, as
opposed to academic institutions.149 As the Fourth Circuit recently put it,
“[T]he Supreme Court has never set aside a state regulation on the basis that
it infringed a First Amendment right to academic freedom. . . . to the extent
it has constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, [the Court]
appears to have recognized only an institutional right of self-governance in
academic affairs.”150
Second, the Supreme Court has not adopted, and the lower courts
that have recently considered the issue have, for the most part, explicitly
rejected, the notion that government employees, including public school
teachers, have any First Amendment right to speak, in their role as employees,
contrary to the dictates of their democratically accountable supervisors.151 In
Id. at 568. The Pickering line of cases also includes Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983),
and United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
148 See text accompanying notes 149-157, infra.
149 For a careful explanation of why the Supreme Court’s dicta regarding academic freedom
does not constitute any sort of holding or rule that would protect teachers in the context
Beckwith discusses, see Malcolm M. Stewart, The First Amendment, The Public Schools, and the
Inculcation of Community Values, 18 J. L & EDUC. 23, 59 (1989).
150 Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 412 (4th Cir. 2000).
151 See, e.g., Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J.
L & EDUC. 1, 6 (2001) (“The Supreme Court has yet to squarely address what level of
protection, if any, should be accorded to teachers’ in-class speech.”); id. at 18 (“From a
practical standpoint, none of the recent circuit decisions applying Pickering have found inclass speech to qualify as a matter of public concern.”). For key cases, see Kirkland v.
Northside Independent School District, 890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1989) (“We hold only
that public school teachers are not free, under the first amendment, to arrogate control of
the curricula); Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 1998)
(“In the case of a public school . . . it is far better policy . . . that the makeup of the
curriculum be entrusted to the local school authorities who are in some sense responsible,
rather than to the teachers, who would be responsible only to the judges, had they a First
147
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other words, even if a teacher may have a right to speak out as a private
citizen in favor of ID (or drug use or Communism or any other unpopular
idea) at a public meeting or in a newspaper editorial without fear of losing his
or her job, the same teacher does not possess the same right to speak out on
those same topics within the classroom, if the relevant authorities have given
sufficiently clear notice that such topics or viewpoints are off-limits. Again,
the Fourth Circuit articulated this position when it explained that prior to
determining whether the Pickering balancing test even applies to a public
employee, the court must determine whether the employee is speaking as a
citizen or rather in her capacity as employee: “This focus on the capacity of
the speaker recognizes the basic truth that speech by public employees
undertaken in the course of their job duties will frequently involve matters of
vital concern to the public, without giving those employees a First
Amendment right to dictate to the state how they will do their jobs.”152
This analysis comports with common sense.
If high level
government officials lack the power to restrict the official government
speech of their employees, then those employees (including teachers) who
serve as spokespersons for the state would have near-complete authority to
countermand the state’s official messages. The Fourth Circuit uses the
example of an assistant district attorney at a formal press conference who
criticizes his boss’s decision to pursue a murder charge,153 but this is only one
of countless possible examples in which Beckwith’s rule would disrupt the
functioning of the government. One only has to imagine the President’s
Press Secretary condemning the war in Iraq, an EPA scientist making an
official statement that a particular type of pollution is far worse than the
Administrator has recognized, or a state employment officer speaking out
against the state’s affirmative action policies to understand the chaos of
recognizing a First Amendment right in a subordinate speaking in his or her
official capacity on matters of public concern.154
Recognizing this right would be just as problematic in the public
schools as it would be elsewhere in the government. There does not seem to
be any principled way to limit Beckwith’s rule to the ID context, and
Beckwith does not suggest any. This means that teachers could teach their
Amendment right to participate in the makeup of the curriculum.”); but see Cockrel v. Shelby
County School Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1051-52 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting approach of the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits).
152 Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 407.
153 See id. at 407-08.
154 For an important discussion of this issue, see Robert C. Post, Between Governance and
Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1775 (1987)
(“When administering its own institutions, the government is invested with a special form of
authority, which I shall call ‘managerial.’ Managerial authority is controlled by first
amendment rules different from those which control the exercise of the authority used by
the state when it acts to govern the general public.”); id. at 1771-72 (using the example of a
government subordinate who insists on presenting his position on some matter instead of
the position that the superior has insisted be presented). See also Stewart, supra n. 149, at 6668 & n. 136.
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views on a whole array of controversial topics, with the school having no
recourse against them whatsoever. Teachers could supplement a sex
education class with their own views about whether condoms actually work
or how HIV is really transferred, suggest that the federally-funded abstinence
lesson they just taught is a “bunch of bunk,” mention at the end of their
health lesson that drugs are in fact “kind of fun,” hint that the evidence
showing the existence of the Holocaust is a “bit overstated,” or argue that
slavery was a mutually beneficial economic arrangement for whites and
blacks alike.
Ensuring that government supervisors can control the official
statements of their subordinates serves to promote democratic accountability
among government decision-makers for the state’s official messages.155
Ultimately, those who speak on the state’s behalf are speaking for its citizens,
and those citizens ought to have some recourse if the state decides to take an
official position that the citizens find abhorrent, offensive, or just plain
wrong. The electoral process provides this accountability check, but only for
those officials at the highest level. It would stand to reason, then, that to
preserve accountability, those highest level officials ought to have the final
say with regard to what messages the state will adopt. If the courts adopted
Beckwith’s position, then citizens would be deprived of any real power to
hold the government accountable for its statements, in cases in which an
employee exercises his or her First Amendment rights to make an official
statement on a controversial issue that is contrary to the message that the
state itself endorses. In other words, if a public school teacher decides to
teach that the Holocaust never happened, the community ought to be able to
pressure the school board (or other relevant decision-making body) to stop
the teacher from promoting this view in the classroom. If the board can
control the teacher’s speech, and the board agrees with the community, then
the teacher will either stop speaking or be fired. If the board does not want
to reprimand the teacher, then the community can vote the relevant board
members off of the board. On the other hand, if the teacher has a First
Amendment right to say what he or she wants, the community will have no
legal or political recourse to stop the teacher from continuing to engage in
the detested speech.156
Of course, Beckwith does not argue that a teacher has a First
Amendment right to replace the prescribed curriculum by teaching ID theory
155 See Stewart, supra n. 149, at 27 (“[T]he basic principle of democratic theory is that
decisions made by popularly-elected officials have the presumptive approval of the
community. . . . When a court orders school officials to present in school programs messages
which the officials have chosen not to present, it is in fact denying the majority of parents
the right to educate their children as they see fit.”).
156 The school or school board could presumably fire the board for appointing the teacher,
but this would not stop the speech, and such a practice would encourage government
employers to hire only the most non-controversial employees, when in fact, sometimes
interesting and controversial speech can be good, so long as the employer can ultimately
control it if it goes too far.
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instead of evolution; rather he argues that a teacher has the right to supplement
the existing evolution curriculum with ID theory. 157 But this distinction does
not save the argument, because there is no reason to think that the analysis is
any different just because the employee first says what he is supposed to say
before putting in his own two cents. A First Amendment rule allowing
supplementation but not replacement would still undermine the functioning
of government and interrupt the lines of democratic accountability. Should
the President’s Press Secretary really be able to say at a press conference that
“the President believes that the war in Iraq is just, but it’s not”? Should a
public school teacher be able to say, “Most people believe that the Holocaust
happened, but they are wrong,” or “the school thinks you shouldn’t have sex,
but I think you should,” if the community strongly disagrees with these
positions?
Finally, it is worth noting that nothing I have said here is meant to
suggest that schools and school boards should regularly choose to restrict
what their teachers may say or do in the classroom. There are certainly
strong educational arguments in favor of allowing teachers wide latitude to
teach the material they wish in the manner they wish, even if sometimes their
teaching methods or materials are controversial. Providing teachers such
leeway also sends the important message both to the community and to the
teachers themselves that teachers are respected professionals whose work is
incredibly important and central to the effective functioning of a democracy.
Indeed, I would think that in the vast majority of cases, school boards should
allow teachers vast freedom to do what they want when they are in front of
their classes. But this argument is based on sound educational policy, not
constitutional law. Saying that schools ought to allow teachers to
supplement the curriculum with their own views in most cases is not the
same thing as saying that teachers should have a First Amendment right to
supplement the curriculum with their own controversial viewpoints in those
few cases in which the community is strongly opposed to that viewpoint.
The latter purported “right” has no basis in constitutional text or precedent
and is contrary to common sense and the ideals of the political community.
Conclusion
In the next few years, it seems likely that courts will start weighing in
on whether public schools may, consistent with the First Amendment, teach
ID theory as an alternative to evolution. The case currently pending in
Pennsylvania may be the first; even if it settles or is decided on other
grounds, there will surely be another case following soon after. When the
See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 76. It is not clear, however, why Beckwith
adopts this position as a matter of First Amendment free speech theory, since the First
Amendment protects private parties from government compelled speech as well as
prohibited speech. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that
individuals have a First Amendment right to cover up state messages on license plates); West
Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (finding students have a First
Amendment right not to say the Pledge of Allegiance).
157

31

courts do get around to deciding this very important issue, they should
realize that although ID may in some ways be different from the antievolution iterations that have come before it, in many ways it is quite the
same. It is best viewed as a religious belief, and teaching it in the public
schools as a scientific theory when it has achieved no success within the
scientific community will likely be understood by a reasonable believer as an
endorsement of religious belief. Professor Beckwith has advanced some
creative arguments in ID’s favor, and critiqued some of my own along the
way, but these ultimately unsuccessful contentions should not distract the
courts from recognizing ID’s inherent constitutional infirmities.
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